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COMPELLED UNIONISM IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
AFTER JANUS: WHY UNIONS SHOULD NOT PROFIT 
FROM DISSENTING EMPLOYEES 
Giovanna Bonafede+ 
Labor unions in the United States have enjoyed a bright spot in history for 
their positive role in the progression of civil rights, workplace safety, gender 
equality, and immigrant rights.1  Unions’ abuse of their power as employees’ 
sole representative, however, has tarnished this bright spot.  As unions grew 
from small organizations into multi-level, profit-seeking organizations, 
employees who dissented from a union’s agenda began to have their voices 
oppressed by the power of compulsory unionism.2  Compulsory unionism has 
forced employees to choose between their political autonomy—choosing 
whether to financially support the union or risk discharge from employment—
and a voice and vote in their working conditions.3 
A union’s power in the private workplace derives largely from the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), a federal statute aimed at “restoring equality of 
 
 + Giovanna Bonafede is an alumna of The Catholic University of America Columbus School of 
Law, Class of 2021 and an alumna of Villanova University, Class of 2018.  For all his guidance 
during this process, she thanks Frank D. Garrison, Esq.  Frank’s edits, advice, and passion for labor 
law were crucial to this Note; no amount of thanks is enough. 
 1. Our Labor History Timeline, AFL-CIO, https://aflcio.org/about-us/history (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2021, 10:30 AM).  The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO) is a “democratic, voluntary federation of 56 national and international 
labor unions that represent[s] 12.5 million working men and women.”  About Us, AFL-CIO, 
https://aflcio.org/about-us (last visited Mar. 22, 2021).  The AFL-CIO uses its financial power, 
derived from the union dues of the workers it supports, to advance and influence legislation and 
invest in a myriad of industries.  Id. 
 2. Compulsory unionism occurs when “forced dues” clauses are negotiated into employee 
contracts.  NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR LABOR RELATIONS RESEARCH, https://nilrr.org/compulsory-
unionism-education/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2021).  Union officials who demand these forced dues 
claim all employees in the bargaining unit get the same benefits “and therefore should pay for the 
union’s representation, regardless of whether it is wanted or not.”  Id.What are Bargaining Units?, 
USAJOBS, https://www.usajobs.gov/Help/faq/job-announcement/bargaining-units/ (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2021). (“A bargaining unit position is a job that is represented by a labor union. . . . Labor 
unions negotiate various conditions of employment . . . , however they [do not] generally negotiate 
compensation or other matters that the management team deems to be their sole prerogative.  If 
your job is in a bargaining unit, you [do not] have to join the union.  However, if you want to join 
a union, your job must be in a recognized bargaining unit.”) Id.  
 3. See Ry. Emp.’s Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 236–39 (1956) (discussing a failed 
constitutional claim under the Railway Labor Act where challengers argued that money forcibly 
obtained to support the union’s political agenda, with which the employees disagreed, violated the 
dissenting employees’ constitutional rights); see also Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 
IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 483 (1950) (arguing that unions subject its members to their disciplinary 
policies, in turn making them conform to their ideologies). 
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bargaining power between employers and employees.”4  The NLRA applies to 
most private sector employers and employees, but does not apply to public sector 
employers, employers of agricultural workers, or employers of interstate 
railroads and airlines.5 
The NLRA gives private sector unions organizational, monetary, and 
disciplinary powers to bargain with the employer on behalf of the employees for 
employment agreements, known as collective bargaining agreements (CBAs).6  
In exchange for the union’s negotiation on CBAs, which  are presumptively 
favorable to employee rights, employees who are “consenting” union members 
must pay dues to the union.7  Historically, employees in certain bargaining units 
had to pay full union dues—whether they were members of the union or not—
until Abood v. Detroit Board of Education and Communications Workers of 
America v. Beck banned the use of compulsory union dues for a union’s political 
spending.8  Because of these opinions, unions in both the public and private 
sector could only exact dues for chargeable activities considered “germane” to 
collective bargaining activities.9  For example, chargeable activities include the 
“negotiating and administering [of] collective agreements, and the costs of the 
 
 4. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). The equality between employers and employees is essential 
because 
[t]he inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full 
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized 
in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and 
affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, 
by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by 
preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within 
and between industries. 
Id. 
 5. Is my Employer Subject to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)?, NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/faq/nlrb/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).  Public 
sector employers are instead restrained by other state and federal statutes that largely mirror the 
regulations in the NLRA.  JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE 
UNIONS, THE LAW, AND THE STATE, 1900–1962 71–72 (2004).  Similarly, railroad and airline 
employers are governed by the Railway Labor Act, a federal statute that has been called the 
statutory equivalent to the NLRA.  Lehnert v. Ferris Fac. Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 555 (1991). 
 6. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).  CBAs are used to mitigate and eliminate obstructions to the free 
flow of commerce by way of negotiating the terms and conditions of the worker’s “employment or 
other mutual aid or protection.”  Id. § 151. 
 7. See, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2012).  “Consenting” union members means employees who 
voluntarily elect to become a part of the union.  Id. 
 8. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 517–19, 522 (banning full compulsory union dues in the public 
sector); Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 752–54 (1988) (banning full 
compulsory union dues in the private sector). 
 9. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 519  (defining chargeable activities as those that are “germane to 
collective-bargaining activit[ies]; . . . justified by the government’s vital policy interest in labor 
peace and avoiding ‘free riders’; . . . and [those that do not] significantly add to the burdening of 
free speech that is inherent in the allowance of agency or union shop.”); Beck, 487 U.S. at 752. 
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adjustment and settlement of disputes.”10  Chargeable activities do not include, 
however, using employees’ dues for the union’s political activities.11  This was 
the prevailing rule in the public sector until the recent Supreme Court case, Janus 
v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, which 
declared all union fees in the public sector unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment.12 
Unfortunately, private sector employees are still required to pay union fees 
against their will, which may violate their First Amendment freedom of speech 
and freedom of association rights.13  For these constitutional protections to apply 
to the private sector and for the holding in Janus to be extended to private sector 
unions, there needs to be a showing of state action, and courts have split on this 
issue.14  As defined in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., state action may 
exist “in the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively 
reserved to the State.”15  When the government itself, or a branch of the 
government, delegates the authority to exercise a uniquely governmental power 
to a private person or entity, then the constitutional protections and limitations 
on that power follow. 
This Note argues that state action is  present under the exclusive representation 
scheme in the private workplace based on a theory of state compulsion.  State 
action exists in private workplaces when labor unions, acting as the exclusive 
representative of the employees under the federal authority of the NLRA, deduct 
fees from dissenting employees.  Private entities, however, do not become state 
 
 10. Beck, 487 U.S. at 745–46, 751–52 (explaining Congress’s intent in creating compulsory 
unionism as a means of cost sharing between employees for mutually beneficial activities such as 
collective bargaining).  See Machinits v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). 
 11. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 522; Beck, 487 U.S. at 752 (explaining that expenditures on political 
activities do not mutually benefit everyone in the bargaining unit, namely those who oppose the 
political causes the union financially supports). 
 12. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478, 2486 (2018) (holding that Illinois’ 
agency-fee scheme “violated the free speech rights of nonmembers by compelling them to subsidize 
private speech on matters of substantial public concern” and that all “public sector agency-shop 
arrangements violate the First Amendment”). 
 13. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (explaining that money is often a form of 
speech because “virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires 
the expenditure of money.”). 
 14. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1977) (stating that “the right of freedom of 
thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak 
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”); see Joseph E. Slater, Will Labor Law Prompt 
Conservative Justices to Adopt a Radical Theory of State Action?, 96 NEB. L. REV. 62, 69 (2017) 
(discussing the implications of a finding of state action in the private sector union context). 
 15. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (refusing to find state action for 
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment when Pennsylvania’s only intervention into the private 
company was to approve a termination practice). 
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actors merely by extensive regulation; private entities need to assume a 
governmental role to fulfill the state action requirement.16 
For nearly fifty years, the Court has consistently held that requiring employees 
to pay money to a union raises serious First Amendment concerns.17  The Court 
has held that employees’ constitutional rights—their First Amendment freedom 
of speech and associations rights—are violated when this money is used for 
political advocacy rather than for activities germane to collective bargaining 
duties of the union.18 
In Janus, the Court went one step further by declaring public sector agency 
fee requirements categorically unconstitutional under the First Amendment.19  
Agency fees—distinct from union dues which union members must pay as a 
prerequisite to union membership—are a percentage of union dues which “cover 
the basic costs that the union incurs representing” workers who decline to join 
their workplace’s union.20  The Court held that “[n]either an agency fee nor any 
other payment to the union may be deducted from a nonmember’s wages, nor 
may any other attempt be made to collect such a payment, unless the employee 
affirmatively consents to pay.”21  In Janus, Mark Janus, a state employee whose 
unit was represented by a public sector union, refused to join the union because 
he opposed both the political and collective bargaining positions in which the 
union participated.22  Mr. Janus challenged the constitutionality of the agency 
fees he was forced to pay in order to remain employed, even though he was not 
a member of the union.23 
Janus has been highly acclaimed by some, and fervently critiqued by others 
in the labor law community.  The question the Court should now decide is 
 
 16. See id. at 358–59 (holding that state action does not exist because a state agency merely 
regulates the action of a private company). 
 17. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), overruled by Janus, 138 S. Ct. 
at 2460. 
 18. William Baude & Eugene Volokh, Compelled Subsidies and the First Amendment, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 171, 171 (2018) (discussing compelled subsidies from unwilling individuals in the 
union and bar membership contexts); see Abood, 431 U.S. at 235–36. 
 19. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018). 
 20. Celine McNicholas et al., Janus and Fair Share Fees, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, Feb. 
21, 2018, https://www.epi.org/publication/janus-and-fair-share-fees-the-organizations-financing-
the-attack-on-unions-ability-to-represent-workers/.  As discussed further in this Note, agency fees 
paid by “employees who do not join the union but are part of the bargaining unit . . . cover the 
union’s expenses related to collective bargaining and contract administration, but no expenses for 
political or ideological advocacy.”  Id. 
 21. Id. at 2486 (holding that employee’s constitutional rights were better protected with a 
system requiring affirmative consent to become a union member rather than the opt-out system the 
court had previously put into place). 
 22. Id. at 2461 (stating that Plaintiff, Mark “Janus believes that the Union’s ‘behavior in 
bargaining does not appreciate the current fiscal crises in Illinois and does not reflect his best 
interests or the interests of Illinois citizens.’”). 
 23. Id. at 2462.  Although Janus was not forced to be a full, participating member of the union, 
he was being forced to financially support the union’s activities.  Id. at 2460. 
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whether private sector employees should enjoy the same First Amendment 
protections in the workplace as their public sector counterparts.  Janus was a 
huge win for right-to-work groups and public sector employees because it 
prohibited public sector unions from forcing nonmembers to pay compulsory 
union fees as a term of their employment.  Under this holding, objecting 
employees have to affirmatively consent to paying union fees rather than having 
to opt-out of the wage-deduction system.24 
As noted above, although the Supreme Court decided the question for public 
sector unions, the question of the constitutionality of compulsory union fees in 
the private sector remains.  Public sector cases implicate the First Amendment 
because there is clear state action from the government.  But it is less clear how 
state action is involved in private sector union cases.  This Note will explore the 
implications of applying the holding in Janus to private sector unions.  It will 
also argue that state action exists in the private sector unionized workplace based 
on theories of exclusive representation, delegation of government authority 
through a federal statute, and the extension of Railway Labor Act (RLA) 
Supreme Court holdings.  This Note will conclude with a discussion of the 
potential areas of litigation that might arise in the post-Janus world. 
I.  PRIOR LAW 
A.  National Labor Relations Act 
The NLRA is a federal statute that outlines the rights and boundaries of 
employees, unions, and employers in private sector labor law.  Congress enacted 
the NLRA to level the playing field between the historically powerful employer 
and the employee who generally lacked leverage in determining his or her terms 
of employment such as wages and hours.25  As noted, the Act applies to most 
private sector employees (including private universities, retailers, health care 
facilities, and manufacturers) but does not apply to federal, state, or local 
governments, employers of agricultural workers, or employers subject to the 
RLA (including airlines and interstate railroads).26  The basic policy declared by 
the NLRA was to 
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow 
of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when 
they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of 
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full 
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of 
 
 24. Id. at 2486. 
 25. See generally STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON LAB. AND PUB. WELFARE, 93D CONG., 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 (Comm. Print 1974).  
The Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) is an amendment to the National Labor Relations 
Act.  Id. at 1. 
 26. Frequently Asked Questions – NLRB, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://
www.nlrb.gov/resources/faq/nlrb#t38n3180 (last visited Jan. 12, 2020). 
682 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 70:677 
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating 
the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or 
protection.27 
The NLRA grants employees the right to “form or join unions; engage in 
protected, concerted activities to address or improve working conditions; or 
refrain from engaging in these activities.”28  It is an important facet of the statute 
that it gives employees protection for either participating in the union or not 
because it means employers or unions may not discriminate against employees 
based on their union membership or lack thereof.  However, this has not always 
been the case.  With the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 and the Taft-Hartley 
Act in 1947, Congress amended the NLRA to restrict the activities and power of 
labor unions.29  These amendments outlawed a type of union security agreement, 
called the closed shop, “wherein a person is required to be a member of the union 
in order to be eligible [for] employment.”30  These amendments, among other 
labor trends in the wake of Congress passing the NLRA, reflected Congress’s 
increasing skepticism of the growing power of labor unions, and the recognition 
that often employees needed to be protected not only from their employers, but 
also from the unions that represented them.31 
B.  Railway Labor Act 
As Congress enacted the NLRA to protect the private sector labor market, 
Congress enacted the RLA to protect the labor markets of interstate railroads 
and airlines.32  Like the NLRA, the RLA was the first federal transportation 
statute “guaranteeing the right of workers to organize and join unions and elect 
representatives without employer coercion or interference.”33  Specifically, the 
 
 27. 29 U.S.C. § 151; see also Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 540 (1992) (holding 
that employers cannot be compelled to distribute union literature to its employees at their place of 
work—giving employees freedom of choice—unless the union can show that no other reasonable 
means of communicating its organizational message exists). 
 28. Frequently Asked Questions – NLRB, supra note 26. 
 29. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON LAB. AND PUB. WELFARE, 93D CONG., LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 409, 545, 734, 1009, 1420 
(Comm. Print 1974).  The Labor Management Relations Act is another name for the Taft-Hartley 
Act. 
 30. THOMAS R. HAGGARD, COMPULSORY UNIONISM, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS: A 
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF UNION SECURITY AGREEMENTS 34 (1978). 
 31. See, e.g., NLRB v. Midwest Transfer Co. of Illinois, 287 F.2d 443 (3d. Cir. 1961) (holding 
that an employer and a union cannot agree to make union membership a condition of initially 
obtaining a job with the employer). 
 32. The Railway Labor Act Simplified, PA. FED’N BMWED-IBT, http://www.pennfedbmwe.
org/Docs/reference/RLA_Simplified.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2020).  The Railway Labor Act was 
amended to include the airline industries, but only initially covered interstate railroads.  Highlights 
of the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), and the U.S. Department of Transporation’s (“DOT”) Role in 
RLA Disputes, FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.
gov/files/fra_net/1647/Railway%20Labor%20Act%20Overview.pdf. 
 33. Id. 
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RLA’s purpose was “to avoid work stoppages that threaten to substantially 
interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the 
country essential transportation services.”34  The RLA tries to encourage 
voluntary settlement of disputes over all other options to avoid interruptions in 
interstate commerce.35 
The importance of mentioning the RLA in a paper involving an issue governed 
by the NLRA is the almost identical nature of the two statutes, as well as the 
outcomes courts have reached on issues that parallel both statutes.  The 
significance of the resemblances between the statutes will be discussed below as 
they pertain to Supreme Court decisions.  The key difference between the RLA 
and the NLRA is that the RLA overrides state right-to-work laws while the 
NLRA does not.36 
C.  Right-to-Work Laws 
During the mid-20th century, Congress proposed changes to the “pro-union” 
structure of the NLRA, enacting provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act that only 
allows “union shops in the absence of state law to the contrary.”37  Union shops 
are workplaces that do not require union membership as a prerequisite to 
obtaining employment but do require that each worker join the union within a 
certain period after being hired.38  The Taft-Hartley Act, later added as section 
14(b) to the NLRA, laid “the foundation for right-to-work laws by allowing 
states to prohibit union security agreements [and] compulsory union 
 
 34. Id.  The RLA applies to “freight and commuter railroads, airlines, companies directly or 
indirectly controlled by carriers who perform services related to transportation of freight or 
passengers and the employees of these railroads, airlines, and companies.”  Id. 
 35. Railway Labor Act, SMART UNION, https://smart-union.org/7113-2/ (last visited Jan. 12, 
2020). 
 36. BENJAMIN COLLINS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, RIGHT TO WORK LAWS: 
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 4 (2014). 
 For example, both a federal appeals court and the Oklahoma Supreme Court have 
determined that Oklahoma’s prohibition of union security agreements does not extend 
to workers covered by the Railway Labor Act. . . . [However,] [s]ince the 104th 
Congress, a National Right to Work bill has been introduced in the House during the 
first session of each Congress.  Similar bills have regularly been introduced in the 
Senate during this time.  These bills would amend the NLRA by striking the language 
that permits union security agreements and would make similar changes to the Railway 
Labor Act. 
Id. at 5–6. 
 37. History of Unions and Right-to-Work Laws, JURIST LEGAL NEWS & COMMENTARY (Dec. 
17, 2013, 10:36:50 PM), https://www.jurist.org/archives/feature/history-of-unions-and-right-to-
work-laws/. 
 38. Union Shop, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/union_
shop (last visited Jan. 12, 2020). 
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membership” that would weaken the dissenting employee’s voice in a unionized 
workplace.39 
Section 14(b) of the NLRA, titled “Agreements requiring union membership 
in violation of State law” reads: “[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed 
as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership 
in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in 
which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.”40  
Twenty-eight states and territories currently have state right-to-work laws, while 
employees in the remaining states and territories are subject to forced 
unionism.41  The existence of right-to-work states is significant for this Note 
because if an employee works in one of these twenty-eight states or territories, 
they “not only have the right to refrain from becoming a union member, [they] 
cannot be required to pay dues or an agency fee to the union unless [they] choose 
to join the union.”42 
D. Supreme Court Cases Before Janus 
1.  Public Sector Cases 
One of the most prolific cases in twentieth century labor law, Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education—which the Supreme Court overturned in Janus—held that 
unions cannot use employee dues or fees to finance political activities that the 
employee does not personally support.43  The Court ruled that although it is 
constitutionally valid to require public sector employees to pay agency fees to 
maintain employment, it is only constitutional “insofar as the service charges are 
applied to collective-bargaining, contract administration, and grievance-
adjustment purposes.”44  While the Court noted it is not holding that “a union 
 
 39. History of Unions and Right-to-Work Laws, supra note 37.  Virginia, the first state to 
enact a Right to Work Law, contains a provision specifically regarding dues payment: “No 
employer shall require any person, as a condition of employment or continuation of employment, 
to pay any dues, fees or other charges of any kind to any labor union or labor organization.”  VA. 
CODE ANN. § 40.1-62 (1970). 
 40. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2012). 
 41. Right to Work States, NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEFENSE FOUNDATION, 
https://nrtw.org/right-to-work-states (last visited Jan. 12, 2020).  The following states and territories 
have enacted right to work laws: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Guam, Idaho, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  Id. 
 42. Can I Be Required to be a Union Member or Pay Dues to a Union? (Private Sector 
Employee), NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK FOUND., https://nrtw.org/required-join-pay-private (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2020). 
 43. See generally Abood, 431 U.S. at 209. 
 44. Id. at 232; see Hanson, 351 U.S. at 225 (stating that unions may not use objector’s union 
funds to “forc[e] ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the First . . . 
Amendment.”); see also Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) (holding a union 
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cannot constitutionally spend [an objector’s] funds for the expression of political 
views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of other 
ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining 
representative[,]” it does state that the Constitution requires  “such expenditures 
be financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees who do not 
object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so against 
their will by the threat of loss of governmental employment.”45 
The Court later decided Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, a 
forced fees case based on constitutional principles.  The Court held that First 
Amendment due process requires unions to provide certain safeguards before 
they can collect forced union fees from public employees.46  The majority 
explained that nonmembers have a constitutional right to prevent the union from 
spending their required fees on political causes, stating that 
[t]he fact that the [nonmembers] are compelled to make, rather than 
prohibited from making, contributions for political purposes works no 
less an infringement of their constitutional rights.  For at the heart of 
the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to 
believe as he will, and that in a free society one’s beliefs should be 
shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the 
State.47 
The Court’s recognition of a First Amendment constitutional right to not have 
nonmember’s fees used for political purposes suggested the Court believed that 
paying is speaking. 
Twenty years later, the Supreme Court decided Davenport v. Washington 
Education Association, affirming the constitutionality of right-to-work laws and 
holding that because unions do not have a constitutional right to collect dues 
from nonmembers, a state may require unions to get affirmative consent from a 
public employee before spending their dues on political activities.48  This 
affirmative consent option conflicted with the default opt-out system most 
unions had in place where, for an objector to ensure that his forced union dues 
 
does not have the power to use a dissenter’s exacted union funds to support political causes which 
he or she opposes). 
 45. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235–36.  It is important to note that this case does not stand for the 
proposition that no union dues can be used towards the advancement of the union’s ideological 
causes; rather, only such expenditures can be financed from dues “paid by employees who do not 
object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so against their will by the 
threat of loss of governmental employment.”  Id. at 236. 
 46. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 310 (1986).  The Court 
specified that the procedural safeguards necessary to protect dissenting nonmembers from forced 
fees were as follows: adequate notice of the fee’s basis along with an independent audit, prompt 
neutral review of nonmember’s challenges, and “an escrow for amounts reasonably in dispute.”  Id. 
at 310. 
 47. Id. at 301 n.9; see Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1976) (discussing the 
implications of the First Amendment freedoms of belief and of association). 
 48. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 191 (2007). 
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were not being used to finance a political campaign, they would have go through 
a tedious process of opting out of political expenditures.49  If an objector did not 
opt-out during the specified period to do so, their dues or fees would 
automatically be used by the union until the next opt-out period.50 
In 2012, the Supreme Court decided Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, establishing 
that “when a public-sector union imposes a special assessment or dues increase, 
the union must provide [a notice of the purpose of the assessment or increase] 
and may not exact any funds from nonmembers without their affirmative 
consent.”51  The Court noted that “‘First Amendment values [would be] at 
serious risk if the government [could] compel a particular citizen, or a discrete 
group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for speech on the side that [the 
government] favors.’”52  This opinion went further than Davenport by requiring 
affirmative consent for dues increases or special expenditures, whatever these 
expenditures were on, rather than simply authorizing the state to implement an 
affirmative consent system. 
The last major public sector union case that set the stage for the decision in 
Janus was the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. Quinn.  The Court held an 
Illinois requirement that nonunion Medicaid-funded home-care personal 
assistants pay union fees unconstitutional under the First Amendment.53  In 
Harris, the Court refused to extend the decision in Abood, which upheld forced 
fees on public employees for collective bargaining purposes, to this situation 
“[b]ecause of Abood’s questionable foundations, and because the personal 
assistants are quite different from full-fledge public employees.”54  The Court 
recognized that the central issues in public sector collective bargaining, “such as 
wages, pensions, and benefits are important political issues.”55  This holding 
foreshadowed what the Court later decided in Janus: if a case involving 
employees more like a typical public employee were to come before the Court, 
a majority may overrule Abood and hold that public sector forced fee 
requirements are unconstitutional. 
Then came the twenty-first century’s landmark case—Janus.  As noted, this 
case overruled Abood and held that public sector agency fee requirements were 
 
 49. Id. at 182.  The union objector used a provision of the Fair Campaign Practices Act in his 
argument: “A labor organization may not use agency shop fees paid by an individual who is not a 
member of the organization to make contributions or expenditures to influence an election or to 
operate a political committee, unless affirmatively authorized by the individual.”  Id. 
 50. See generally id. at 183 (describing the process of the “Hudson packet” opt-out 
procedure). 
 51. Knox v. SEIU Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 322 (2012).  The Court also held that unions 
cannot constitutionally charge nonmembers for its expenditures opposing ballot questions even if 
they “may be said to have an effect on present and future contracts between public-sector workers 
and their employers.”  Id. at 320–21. 
 52. Id. at 322 (quoting United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 411 (2001)). 
 53. Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 620 (2014). 
 54. Id. at 645–46. 
 55. Id. at 636. 
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unconstitutional under the First Amendment.56  The Court declared that 
“[n]either an agency fee nor any other payment to the union may be deducted 
from a nonmember’s wages, nor may any other attempt be made to collect such 
a payment, unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay.”57 
2. Private Sector Cases 
Private sector cases, like Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, have been 
decided differently and with greater deference to unions than their public sector 
counterparts.  Nevertheless, in Ellis, the Court held that under the RLA, coerced 
financial support of a union’s ideological or political causes, and other union 
activities not concerning the dissenting employee’s particular bargaining unit, is 
prohibited.58 The Court reasoned: 
[B]y allowing the union at all, we have already countenanced a 
significant impingement on First Amendment rights.  The dissenting 
employee is forced to support financially an organization with whose 
principles and demands he may disagree.  ‘To be required to help 
finance the union as a collective-bargaining agent might well be 
thought…to interfere in some way with an employee’s freedom to 
associate for the advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as 
he sees fit.’59 
The majority went even further by prohibiting the union’s improper use of 
dissenter’s funds even for temporary use, thus prohibiting “rebate” schemes 
where unions could use dues or fees for improper uses and only later refund the 
amount exacted to dissenting employees.60 
Later the Court declared in Communications Workers v. Beck that the NLRA 
and RLA’s provisions authorizing compulsory unionism arrangements are 
substantially “identical” and that Congress intended for them “to have the same 
meaning.”61  The Court thus held that like the RLA in Hudson, the NLRA 
“authorizes the exaction of only those fees and dues necessary to ‘performing 
the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the 
employer on labor-management issues.’”62  Private sector employees thus were 
granted the same rights as airline, railway, and public employees to not subsidize 
a union’s non-bargaining activities. 
 
 56. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018). 
 57. Id. at 2486.  The Court explained that “[b]y agreeing to pay, nonmembers are waiving 
their First Amendment rights, and such a waiver cannot be presumed.”  Id. 
 58. Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., 466 U.S. 435, 455–56 (1984). 
 59. Id. at 455.  The Court notes that although the dissenting employee’s First Amendment 
rights have been infringed upon in this case, “[i]t has long been settled that such interference with 
First Amendment rights is justified by the governmental interest in industrial peace.”  Id. at 455–
56. 
 60. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 457. 
 61. Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 746–47 (1988). 
 62. Id. at 762–63 (quoting Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448). 
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II. JANUS’ IMPACT 
Before Janus, hundreds of thousands of employees had large portions of their 
money unfairly exacted from them without their consent.  After four decades of 
old precedent created by Abood, public employers and labor unions can no 
longer require employees to pay for the unions’ costs of negotiating and 
enforcing labor contracts on employees’ behalf.63  This decision gave protected 
employees First Amendment freedom of speech and freedom of association 
rights once and for all.  It allowed those dissenters to be free from any financial 
coercion, not only for the union’s political causes, but also for contract 
negotiations and administration.  Because of Janus, thousands of public sector 
labor-management contracts affecting millions of government employees were 
partially invalidated.64  This decision will more than likely have a considerable 
adverse effect on union revenues and union membership in the “twenty-two 
states [plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia] that allowed government 
employers to collect fair-share fees from union-represented employees who 
chose not to join the union.”65 
Critics of the decision consider Janus to be “a huge blow to public-sector 
unions and the labor movement,” and view the decision a win for so-called 
connivingly opportunistic “free-riders.”66  Those who oppose the holding in 
Janus argue that now, “union members have an incentive to become ‘free-
riders,’ benefiting from collective bargaining but not paying for it.”67  The 
critiquing argument sides with Justice Elena Kagan’s dissenting opinion which 
scrutinized the majority’s cold shoulder to the stare decisis doctrine, arguing that 
the majority “overturned a previous decision, deeply entrenched in the real 
world, with little justification.”68  It does so, Kagan wrote, “by weaponizing the 
First Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now and in the future, to 
intervene in economic and regulatory policy.”69  This argument, however, is 
 
 63. Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine L. Fisk, Exaggerating the Effects of Janus: A Reply to 
Professors Baude and Volokh, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 42, 42 (2018). 
 64. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2487–88 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(“More than 20 States have statutory schemes built on the decision.  Those laws underpin thousands 
of ongoing contracts involving millions of employees.  Reliance interests do not come any stronger 
than those surrounding Abood.  And likewise, judicial disruption does not get any greater than what 
the Court does today.”); Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 63, at 42–43.  Janus only invalidated the 
“agency fee” portions of collective bargaining agreements.  Id. 
 65. Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 63, at 42. 
 66. Alana Semuels, Is This the End of Public-Sector Unions in America?, THE ATLANTIC 
(June 27, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/janus-afscme-public-
sector-unions/563879/. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  A study by Frank Manzo and Robert Bruno, skeptics of Janus, suggest “[t]he decision 
could also mean that unions will have less political impact than they once did.  The decline of 
unions has already had implications for national politics: Some analyses argue that Hillary Clinton 
would have been elected president had union membership been higher.”  Id. 
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incorrect, superficial, and charged with political bias, without regard for the 
Constitution and the minority views of employees. 
A. Post-Janus Litigation 
In the wake of Janus, there has been a rise in labor litigation on multiple 
fronts.  First, there have been dozens of suits filed “seeking repayment of fees 
paid going back for as many years as the statute of limitations will allow.”70  If 
courts conclude that Janus applies retroactively, the potential liabilities are 
staggering because the unions will be forced to refund or pay damages for all the 
fees paid by dissenting employees within applicable statute of limitations.71  For 
example, in Oliver v. Service Employees International Union Local 668, a 
former union member brought suit seeking monetary damages against her 
former union for “membership dues paid to the Union from the beginning of her 
employment in December 2014 through the date of her resignation in August 
2018.”72  The plaintiff argued that she could not have “given her ‘affirmative 
consent’ in her choice to become a member and is now entitled to a full refund 
on her membership dues.”73  The court, however, disagreed and held that she 
cannot recover damages because she was not compelled to join the union in the 
first place.74  This court also discussed issues concerning both standing and 
mootness because the plaintiff was no longer a union member.75  Similarly, in 
Hendrickson v. AFSCME, Council 18, a former union member and state 
employee brought action against the union alleging violation of his First 
Amendment rights to free speech and free association, and seeking monetary 
damages for past union dues.76  Like in Oliver, the court held that the employee’s 
claim for relief requesting past union dues was moot because the employee 
voluntarily chose to contract with the union, therefore negating any First 
Amendment claim.77 
 
 70. Catherine L. Fisk, Janus and the Future of Unions, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, 
https://www.acslaw.org/analysis/acs-supreme-court-review/janus-and-the-future-of-unions/ (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2021).  Fisk also highlights another issue Janus poses: whether the decision will 
lead to a dramatic drop in union membership.  Id.  She suggests that anti-union groups are going 
head to head with unions in encouraging employees to “quit their union and quit paying dues by 
convincing them that they can get the benefits of the union contract without paying for it,” while 
unions are “vigorously signing up fee-payers as full members.”  Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Oliver v. SEIU, Local 668, 415 F. Supp. 3d 602, 605 (E.D. Pa. 2019). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 613.  The court noted that “[a]gency fees are not at issue in this case, because they 
would be subsumed by the union dues that Plaintiff voluntarily paid.  Even if they were, no federal 
court has interpreted Janus as entitling non-members to a refund of agency fees.”  Id. at 608 n.7; 
see Cook v. Brown, 364 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1193 (D. Or. 2019) (noting that “there is no indication 
that Janus intended to open the floodgates to retroactive monetary relief.”). 
 75. Oliver, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 613. 
 76. Hendrickson v. AFSCME Council 18, 434 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1018 (D.N.M. 2020), aff’d, 
No. 20-2018, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 8878 (10th Cir. Mar. 26, 2021). 
 77. Id. at 1022. 
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Second, many suits have been filed seeking to expand the prohibition on union 
dues to a full prohibition on union exclusive representation based on a majority 
rule.78  The plaintiff’s argument is that: 
[I]f paying fees to support bargaining is unconstitutional, it should be 
unconstitutional for a union to negotiate a contract on behalf of those 
who do not want union representation at all.  Anti-union advocates 
have lost those cases before.  The majority stated that it was not calling 
majority-rule representation into doubt.79 
Cases like Bierman v. Dayton, highlight the opposing view rejecting 
challenges to exclusive representation.80  Here, the plaintiffs claimed the 
Minnesota law, which permitted union representation, violated their First 
Amendment right to freedom of association.81  The court was not convinced, 
finding that “the employees had not shown that the state’s recognition of the 
union infringed on the First Amendment rights of non-members to freedom of 
association in the form of a mandatory agency relationship, as they were not 
required to pay dues or union fees.”82 
The theories behind these two types of prospective litigation support this 
Note’s greater argument that Janus should be extended to the private sector 
because public sector employees should not be afforded greater constitutional 
protections just because they work for the government. 
Currently, private sector employees in unionized workplaces have an option 
that could partially satisfy their disdain for financing a cause they do not support, 
at least for the short term.  These employees who do not wish to be union 
members can file paperwork as a Beck objector, “which means they pay lower 
fees that go only to collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance 
adjustment.”83  Yet, the fee reduction for the Beck objector is usually only about 
fifteen percent less than normal full union dues, and for many busy employees, 
 
 78. See Fisk, supra note 70. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Bierman v. Dayton, 900 F.3d 570, 572 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043 
(2019). 
 81. Id.; see also Mentele v. Inslee, 916 F.3d 783, 791 (9th Cir. 2019) (designation of SEIU as 
the exclusive bargaining representative did not violate worker’s First Amendment rights); Branch 
v. Commonwealth Emp. Relations Bd., 481 Mass. 810, 828–29 (2019) (finding exclusive 
representation coupled with the duty of fair representation not to be violative of the Constitution); 
Uradnik v. Inter Fac. Org., No. 18-1895, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165951 (D. Minn. Sept. 27, 2018) 
(denying a motion for a preliminary injunction in case challenging constitutionality of forced 
representation by a union). 
 82. Ronald J. Kramer, Janus One Year Later: Litigation Has Come, AM. BAR ASS’N, (July 
23, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/state_local_government/publications/state_local_
law_news/2018-19/summer/janus-one-year-later-litigation-has-come/. 
 83. Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Supreme Court’s Janus Ruling Could Undercut Private Sector 
Unions Too, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (July 11, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-
janus-private-sector-ramifications-20180709-story.html. 
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this unfortunately is not worth the hassle.  More enticing would be the option to 
opt out entirely. 
This Note argues that the one obstacle that courts have found when debating 
whether the decision in Janus can be extended to the private sector—state 
action—is a non-issue because of the clear federal authorization of union action 
through the NLRA and the RLA.84  This Note will argue that the exclusive 
representation scheme set up by the federal government is also evidence of state 
action because of the government-like coercive monopoly power unions are 
granted because of these federal statutes.85  Further, the collective bargaining 
agreement is nothing like a sample contract between two private entities, rather 
it is like a contract between a private actor and a government actor.  A finding 
of state action in the private sector union context would extend the holding in 
Janus to the private sector, thus protecting private sector employees from being 
forced to pay fees to unions which they do not support. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A.   State Action Exists in the Private Sector: Private Employees Should be 
Afforded the Same Protections as Public Employees 
1. State Action Doctrine 
There are three main judicially created theories of state action: nexus, 
conspiracy, and the Edmonson test.  The nexus theory of state action applies 
when government regulations underlie the claim of state action.86  This theory 
focuses on the link between the government regulation and the alleged 
constitutional violation: “[t]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently 
close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the regulated entity 
so the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”87  The 
conspiracy or joint action theory of state action involves a court’s examination 
of “whether state officials and private parties have acted in concert in effecting 
a particular deprivation of constitutional rights.”88  The plaintiff may prove joint 
action by showing that there was “a conspiracy or by showing [a] private party 
was ‘a willful participant in the joint action.’”89  The Edmonson state action test 
involves a two-part inquiry: (1) the deprivation must be caused by exercising 
some right or privilege created by the state or by a rule of conduct imposed by 
the state or by a person for whom the state is responsible; and (2) the party 
 
 84. See, infra 24−26. 
 85. See, infra 26−27. 
 86. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). 
 87. Id.; see Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 
991, 1002–05 (1982). 
 88. See Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 445 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Gallagher v. Neil Young 
Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1453 (10th Cir. 1995)). 
 89. See id. 
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charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a 
state actor.90 
State action is affirmatively present under the exclusive representation scheme 
in the private workplace based on a theory of state compulsion.  This is because, 
“[t]he state action doctrine allows a court to find that private actions constitute 
government activity if there is significant involvement by the government.”91  
To illustrate, in Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., the Supreme Court 
held that even though Amtrak was a nominally private corporation, it “could be 
sued as a government actor under the First Amendment because of the extensive 
role the federal government played in Amtrak’s activities.”92  Although there are 
several variations of the state action doctrine, courts emphasize the nature and 
scope of the government involvement.93  Private sector unions collecting agency 
fees could be treated as government actors in ways consistent with the state 
action doctrine for two main reasons.94  First, the state action doctrine is fact-
intensive, applied flexibly, and lacks hard rules in its application.95  The second 
reason is that “private sector unions’ use of agency shop agreements could be 
construed as nominally private decisions that have been encouraged by the 
government to the extent that they constitute state action.”96  The state action 
doctrine does not concretely answer whether Janus—striking down public sector 
agency fees—applies to the private sector.97  Due to this uncertainty, “the 
Supreme Court could hold that the NLRA’s structure has given such a powerful 
incentive for unions to pursue agency fee arrangements, that unions doing so are 
effectively engaging in state action.”98 
2.  State Action Under the NLRA & RLA 
The Supreme Court outlined in Communications Workers of America v. Beck 
that any action taken under the RLA—a federal statute equivalent to the 
NLRA—constitutes state action.99  This supports the overall argument that 
unions, when acting under federal statutes, are state actors because they act 
 
 90. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991). 
 91. Boyd Garriott, How Janus Could Spill into the Private Sector Without Radically 
Redefining the State Action Doctrine, ONLABOR (Apr. 19, 2018), https://onlabor.org/how-janus-
could-spill-into-the-private-sector-without-radically-redefining-the-state-action-doctrine/. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.; see Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250–251 (1963) (holding that a 
private restaurant’s discriminatory behavior was state action because a local ordinance required the 
restaurant to discriminate). 
 97. Garriott, supra note 91. 
 98. See Garriott, supra note 91. 
 99. Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 761–63 (1988); see Int’l Ass’n of 
Machinists, AFL-CIO v. Cent. Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 695–96 (1963). 
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under color of federal law.100  That unions operate, in part, to aid in the peaceful 
and reliable settlement of employee grievances, and are aided in that exercise by 
the federal force given to collective bargaining agreements paid under federal 
law, is precisely the nexus between government and private actors that the First 
Circuit found sufficient to constitute state action in Linscott v. Miller Falls Co.101  
It is like the circumstances where parties subject to the NLRA are forced to act 
or refrain from acting by the mandates of the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB), which the First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have all held to constitute 
state action.102 
In three paramount cases, the Supreme Court found state action under the 
RLA: Hanson, Street, and Ellis.  In Hanson, the Court held that state action was 
present because “the federal statute is the source of the power and authority by 
which any private rights are lost or sacrificed.”103  In Street, the Court reaffirmed 
its conclusion in Hanson that using dissenting members’ dues, which were 
compelled by a union security agreement negotiated under the RLA, involved 
state action.104  That said, the Court in Hanson held that because the statute itself 
prohibited the use of dissenting members’ dues for political purposes, the case 
could be decided without reaching the constitutional issue.105  Last, in Ellis, the 
 
 100. Metaphors, like the phrase “act under color of law,” refer to a concept “in which a target 
domain is understood in terms of a source domain of more readily comprehended, embodied 
experience.”  Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323, 
390 (1992). 
 101. Linscott v. Miller Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1971) (finding state action under the 
LMRA, comparing the LMRA to the RLA). 
 102. See Beck v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 776 F.2d 1187, 1207–09 (4th Cir. 1985); 
Linscott, 440 F.2d at 16–17; Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1970). 
 103. Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 231–32 (1956).  The Court described the 
wide-ranged issues that are tendered under the First Amendment: 
 It is argued that the union shop agreement forces men into ideological and political 
associations which violate their right to freedom of conscience, freedom of association, 
and freedom of thought protected by the Bill of Rights.  It is said that once a man 
becomes a member of these unions he is subject to vast disciplinary control and that 
by force of the federal Act unions now can make him conform to their ideology.  On 
the present record, there is no more an infringement or impairment of First Amendment 
rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is required to be a 
member of an integrated bar. 
Id. at 236–38. 
 104. Street, 367 U.S. at 746–50.  The Court again evaded answering the constitutional 
questions, ruling that the RLA “prohibits unions from using objecting nonmembers’ compulsory 
dues for political purposes.  The Court did not clearly define political purposes, nor did it address 
whether unions could lawfully use objectors’ monies for nonpolitical activities unrelated to 
collective bargaining.”  Foundation Supreme Court Cases, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL 
DEFENSE FUND, https://www.nrtw.org/foundation-supreme-court-cases/ (last visited Mar. 22, 
2021). 
 105. Street, 367 U.S. at 748–49. 
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Court revealed again its conclusion that state action exists when parties subject 
to the RLA negotiate union security agreements.106 
3.  Exclusive Representation 
State action is present in a private unionized environment under the exclusive 
representation relationship between unions and employees.  This relationship is 
authorized by the NLRA, a federal labor statute.107  The NLRA provides unions 
with organizational, disciplinary, and monetary power that is the functional 
equivalent of “granting governmental coercive power to unions.”108  Exclusive 
representation can become coercive because once a union representative has 
been certified, they are the sole way employees may communicate with their 
employer concerning terms of employment.109  And based on the collective 
bargaining agreement negotiated by the union and the employer, the union 
representative has the power to execute and administer the rules of the CBA.110  
State action thus exists through the government delegation of union power over 
private employers and employees through the NLRA.  But for the federal 
government’s authorization of union imposition into the private workplace 
through the NLRA, unions would not have the power to collect money, 
discipline employees, and enforce CBAs.  In this way, unions serve as actors on 
behalf of the federal government. 
4. Close Government Regulation 
A union’s exclusive representation relationship imposes state action into a 
private workplace because of the close government regulation of all aspects of 
the collective bargaining process .  CBAs are unlike any other contract between 
private parties, and instead resemble government contracts.  Mainly, CBAs are 
created through a government-controlled process, a process in which First 
Amendment speech rights are suspended because of the union’s status as the 
employees’ exclusive representative.111  Moreover under the NLRA, union 
representatives are selected through an election process executed by the NLRB, 
an independent government agency charged with enforcing the NLRA.112  
Further, the government controls the contract discussions and negotiations, 
 
 106. Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., 466 U.S. 435, 455–56 (1984). 
 107. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012).  Exclusive representation is not required unless employees 
vote for the union as their exclusive representative.  Robert P. Hunter, Exclusive Representation, 
MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y (May 1, 1997), https://www.mackinac.org/1007. 
 108. See Hunter, supra note 107. 
 109. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a); see J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337–38 (1994) (interpreting 
the NLRA and RLA as prohibiting employees from individually negotiating their terms and 
conditions of employment where an exclusive bargaining representative has been recognized). 
 110. 29 U.S.C. § 151; see Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202–03 (1944) 
(holding that exclusive representatives have the duty to represent non-members “fairly”). 
 111. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). 
 112. Id. § 153(a)–(b). 
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which imposes a duty to bargain in good faith upon the union and the employer 
over the employees’ terms of employment.113 
CBAs differ from other contracts between private parties in that the 
government regulates who can be fired and when, imposes special procedures to 
enforce the CBA, and imposes agent-principal rules on the parties.114  For 
example, the NLRA prohibits an employee from being fired based on their union 
membership status.115  That the government regulates the conduct of all parties 
to the contract is unlike other contracts between private parties where  the parties 
themselves govern their conduct.  This indicates that unions are more 
comparable to government actors than to private parties, based on unions’ power 
over the structure and execution of the workplace they represent. 
Extensive regulation does not, however, transform private entities into 
government entities.116  Rather, it is when an entity performs those functions that 
have been traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the federal government that 
it is considered a government agency.117 
5. Governmental Pressure to Include Union Security Clauses 
Union security clauses are commonplace in CBAs because of governmental 
pressure to include them.  Although the Taft-Hartley Act outlawed closed shop 
agreements—agreements  requiring persons to be members of the union to be 
eligible for employment—agency fee agreements are still permitted in the 
private sector.118  These agreements require employees in the bargaining unit to 
join the union, if only in the financial sense of paying core dues to the union, to 
maintain employment with the employer.119  Although employers and unions do 
not have to agree to a union security clause, the government, through the NLRA, 
places substantial pressure on the parties to do so as these clauses are mandatory 
subjects of bargaining.120  Because the NLRB administers union security 
 
 113. Id. § 158(d). 
 114. Id. at §§ 158(a)(3), 158(e); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967) (establishing that, “as 
the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in [the] bargaining unit, the Union ha[s] 
a statutory duty fairly to represent all of those employees, both in its collective bargaining[], and in 
its enforcement of the resulting collective bargaining agreement”) (citations omitted); Miranda 
Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962) (holding for the first time that a union’s breach of its statutory 
duty of fair representation is a union unfair labor practice). 
 115. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). 
 116. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974). 
 117. Id. at 351; see also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946). 
 118. Pattern Makers’ League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 111 (1985). 
 119. NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 739–40 (1963). 
 120. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(d), 159(a); see Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. at 737–38, 740 
(showing that governmental pressure to agree to some form of union security clause is applied by 
the NLRB and the federal courts); see also Queen Mary Rest. Corp. v. NLRB, 560 F.2d 403, 409 
(9th Cir. 1977); see also NLRB v. Andrew Jergens Co., 175 F.2d 130, 133 (9th Cir. 1949). 
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clauses, this direct governmental involvement supports a finding of state 
action.121 
6.  Payment of Dues by Nonmembers 
More evidence of state action in the private workplace branches off from 
nonunion members inescapably subject to union security clauses.  Because 
union security clauses apply to all private employees in the bargaining unit, 
individuals are compelled to become financial members of the union even if they 
are not compelled to participate in union activities.122  This means that 
nonmembers are being compelled by the NLRB to support an entity they dislike, 
or be fired.  This “pay-or-leave” requirement imposed by the NLRB cannot be 
said to be private conduct.  It is the federal agency, not the union itself, that will 
uphold and require firing of a nonmember who refuses to pay dues. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
State action is affirmatively present under the exclusive representation scheme 
in the private workplace based on a theory of state compulsion.  In the union 
context, private actors (the unions) are directly authorized by the legislature 
(through the NLRA) to wield the specific power used to infringe dissenting 
employees’ First Amendment rights.  Thus, the constitutional protections of the 
First Amendment apply when recalcitrant nonunion members are being subject 
to compulsory unionism. 
It is unjust and unconstitutional to allow the views of minority workers to be 
suppressed by the impending and coercive power of American labor unions.  
Unions have grown far too political and have lost sight of the very reason they 
were created: to ensure that the individual voices of workers in the workplace 
were not overpowered by their employers or by superiors.  Unfortunately, unions 
have created an environment they had at first wanted to mend.  The dissenter 
should maintain just as much power and constitutional rights in the private sector 
as in the public sector. 
 
 121. See Havas v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 509 F. Supp. 144, 149 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(finding state action under the NLRA based on the federal government’s “omnipresent weight and 
power in this case behind the agency shop clause contained in the collective bargaining 
agreement.”). 
 122. See Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 761–63 (1988) (holding that 
nonunion private sector employees must pay union dues covering collective bargaining activities). 
